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I. INTRODUCTION
"iM6xico es nuestro!"' "iGanamos!,, 2 On July 2, 2000, Mexican voters
shouted their exuberance for President Vicente Fox's
3  victory over the
Institutional Revolutionary Party ("PRI"), 4 finally dethroned after a seventy-one
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2005; B.A., Spanish,
California State University, Sacramento, 2002. I want to thank my parents, Jan and Oscar Timmons, my
grandmother, Hilda Benvenuto, and my sister, Holly Timmons, and my best friend, Kevin Macklin, for their
love and support. Licensed Mexican attorney Virginia Lizeth Blackman reviewed this article for accuracy.
1. "Mexico is ours!" Mexico Embraces Change, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 2000, at A18.
2. "We won!" Id.
3. Vicente Fox Quesada is the 15th President of Mexico. Mention of Fox, the Fox Administration, the
Administration, or the President in this Comment is in reference to Vicente Fox unless otherwise noted.
4. See Carol Wise, Mexico's Democratic Transition: The Search for New Reform Coalitions, 9 NAFTA
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 283, 285-305 (detailing the inception and development of the PRI political party). Mexican
revolutionaries formed the PRI in 1929 and later it emerged as a semi-authoritarian party. Id. at 285-86. Despite
growing corruption, the PRI remained popular until the late 1990s when Mexico's gross domestic product
("GDP") plummeted and inflation approached three digits. Id. at 286-88. At that time, the PRI's traditional left
wing constituency criticized the more conservative decisions of the PRI. Id. at 290. The remaining PRI loyalists
came from the less industrialized parts of the country, with high illiteracy rates, and limited access to
educational media channels. Id. at 288. The PRI's defeat in 2000, by President Fox, showed that PRI followers
consisted of the less-educated population who prefer higher spending on government assistance programs. Id. at
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year reign.5 While the United States rarely sees one political party control the
presidency for more than two consecutive terms,6 the PRI dominated the
executive branch since the birth of Mexico's democracy because of low inflation,
generous state assistance, and high growth rates.7 Foreign investors are concerned
about this drastic change in government and its effect on foreign investment in
Mexico.8
Apart from the influence of President Fox, several changes within the
maquiladora industry alarmed investors. Tax changes, such as the permanent
establishment tax and Article 303, dramatically altered maquiladoras in Mexico.9
The appreciating peso and the competition from China further affected
investment in Mexico.' ° These substantial changes, all within the last four years,
transformed maquiladora investment in Mexico from a standard business to a
fluctuating market on the verge of complete elimination." Consequently, Fox's
response to this period of change in the maquiladora industry is vital to investors.
This comment explores the impact of the Fox presidency on the maquiladora
industry. Part II provides a background of maquiladora 2 foreign investment in
304. In addition, the PRI's fall from executive power further engrained the party's traditional nature, with
authoritarian and populist tendencies that are out of touch with a more democratically minded electorate. Id. at
305; see also Mexican Political Parties, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 1, 2003, at 12A (noting that PRI
presidents have been leftist, centrist, and recently pro-business).
5. Mexico Embraces Change, supra note 1, at A18; Mexican Presidents and Heads of State, Mexico
Connect, (2003), at http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/history/presidents.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Fox Wins Mexican Presidency, Ending 71-Year PRI Dynasty,
CNN, (2000), available at http://www.cnn.com20OO/WORLD/americas/07/03/mexico.elections/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Fox Wins] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (showing Vicente Fox as
the 15th President of Mexico since the office's creation in 1929). President Fox is a member of the National
Action Party ("PAN"). Id.; see also infra note 44 (explaining the background of the PAN political party);
Jennifer E. Harman, Comment, Mexican President Vicente Fox's Proposal for NAFTA into a European Union-
Style Common Market-Obstacles and Outlook, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 207, 210 (2001) (noting that Mexican
citizens elected President Fox on July 2, 2000, but he did not take office until December 1, 2000).
6. See The Presidents of the United States of America from George Washington to George W. Bush,
Enchanted Learning, at http://www.enchantedleaming.comhistory/us/pres/list.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2003)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that over the last fifty years the United States has elected
six Republican and four Democratic Presidents).
7. Wise, supra note 4, at 286. See Fox Wins, supra note 5 (acknowledging that the PRI controlled the
presidency since the office's inception seventy-one years prior).
8. See also Tim Weiner & Graham Gori, Can Mexico's New Leader Really Work Wonders?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 3 (Money and Business), at I (acknowledging the profound expectations of Mexicans
and foreign investors placed on Fox's election); Shannon Buggs, Investors Should Consider Mexico, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 17, 2000, (Business), at 1 (relating that the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Mexico's stock exchange,
increased more than six percent the day after the election). Investors maintain that significant positive changes
in the Mexican economy after the election are still in the future. Id.
9. See infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text (reviewing the effects of the permanent establishment
tax and Article 303 provisions).
10. See infra notes 130-75 and accompanying text (exploring the effects of the appreciated peso and the
competition from China).
11. See Susan Ferriss, Mexico's Broken Dream; After Surge, Manufacturing Jobs Move to China,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 16, 2003, (Business), at 4H [hereinafter Mexico's Broken Dream] (stating that
Mexicans doubt the future of manufacturing in Mexico as a result of the maquiladora crisis).
12. See Randmom House Unabridged Dictionary 1173 (2nd Ed. 1982 (explaining how to pronounce the
word maquiladora). Maquiladora (ma-quila-dora) is pronounced (ma kS'la d6r 'a). Id. The dictionary's concise
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Mexico prior to the Fox presidency. Part III discusses the complex challenges in
foreign investment resulting from decisions made by the Fox Administration, as
well as other far-reaching problems facing foreign investment in Mexico. Part IV
provides an overview of President Fox's accomplishments in foreign investment
in Mexico. Finally, Part V of this comment informs investors regarding the future
of maquiladora foreign investment in Mexico. This comment concludes that
Mexico remains an attractive location to U.S. investors engaged in manufacturing
but it is not as attractive for investors from other countries. In addition, the Fox
Administration will need to strengthen Mexico's infrastructure and energy supply
in order to remain competitive with other desirable manufacturing locations,
particularly China.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Foreign Investment in Mexico and the Maquiladora Industry
Mexico is an advantageous destination for foreign investment because of its low
labor costs and proximity to the United States." In 2003, A.T. Kearney, a consulting
firm, ranked Mexico as the world's third most desirable country for foreign
investment after the United States and China.'
4 A major sector of foreign investment
in Mexico is the maquiladora industry."5 Mexico established maquiladoras in 1965 to
encourage foreign corporations to operate businesses along the northern border of
Mexico.' 6 Since the late 1990s, maquiladoras have primarily focused on assembling,
pronunciation key explains the phonetics: a = a as in alone, a as in Equal, and 6 as in order. Id.; U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA DECLINE AFFECTS U.S.-MEXICO 
BORDER
COMMUNITIES AND TRADE; RECOVERY DEPENDS IN PART ON MEXICO'S ACTIONS, GAO Report No. 03-891, 5
n.1, 6 (2003) [hereinafter GAO Report No. 03-891] (noting that the term "maquiladora" is derived from the
Spanish word maquilar, which is a service that a miller provides when he or she grinds wheat into flour).
Similarly, a maquiladora provides assembly services without necessarily taking ownership of the goods being
assembled. Id. at 5 n. 1. The term maquiladora has expanded to include all subsidiary plants in Mexico owned by
foreign investors. Id. at 6. However, official maquiladoras register with the Mexican government to receive
preferential tariffs on inputs and machinery and simplified customs procedures. Id. at 6.
13. See id. at 5, 37 (2003) (noting reasons foreign investors have invested and continue to invest in
Mexico). In the 1960s, low labor costs originally enticed investors to Mexico. Id. at 5. Despite competition from
other countries, Mexico remains an important site for investors because of its proximity to the United States. Id.
at 37; see also Paulo Monteiro, Mexico Still Considered Good Market for Carmakers Despite Economic Woes
and Weak Auto Sector Outlook, WORLD MARKETS RES. CENTRE DAILY ANALYSIS, Oct. 14, 2003 (stating that
even though Mexico ranks high for foreign investment, the outlook remains mixed for future investment in
Mexico).
14. See Ricardo Sandoval, Mexican Economy Sees a Bit of Hope, Despite Slump, Nation Ranks High on List of
Best Places to Expand, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 10, 2003, (Business), at ID (quoting Carlos Niezen, a principal
in A.T. Keamey's Mexico City office, who stated that Mexico enjoys the perception of a stable economy). This third
place ranking is a notable improvement from Mexico's ninth place ranking in 2002. Id.
15. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 1 (acknowledging that Mexico's maquiladora
program is the largest and most dynamic factor in U.S.-Mexico trade).
16. See id. at 5 (explaining that the maquiladora program was established as a part of the Border
Industrialization Program to develop the U.S.-Mexico border).
2004 / Fox Tracks Across the Mexican Maquiladora Industry
manufacturing, and exporting finished products.17 Maquiladoras currently account for
one-half of Mexico's total exports. '8 Maquiladoras offered foreign investors the
ability to take advantage of temporary importation of inputs' 9 from foreign sources
without payment of import duties."
To take full advantage of the maquiladora program and achieve recognition as an
"official" maquiladora, firms must register with the Mexican government.2 ' Foreign
investors need to maintain a corporate presence in order to register as a
maquiladora.22 After registration, the maquiladora firms are eligible for preferential
tariffs on inputs and machinery and simplified customs procedures.23  The
maquiladora industry reached its peak in October of 2000.24
17. Carlos Angulo-Parra & Edmundo Elfas-Femndez Juarez, Mexico: Maquiladoras and NAFTA
Beyond Year 2000, The National Law Center, (July 1996), available at http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/
spmxcu4.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (relating the background
of the maquiladora industry). In the initial stages of the maquiladora program the Mexican government only
waived import duties on materials imported for incorporation into finished products for export. Id.
Subsequently, maquiladoras' primary focus became assembly and manufacture. Id.
18. See Jesus Cafilas & Roberto Coronado, Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present and Future Bus.
FRONTIER (Fed. Res. Bank Dallas, El Paso Branch), Issue 2 (2002) (noting the accomplishments of the
maquiladora industry).
19. See Lucinda Varga, NAFTA, The U.S. Economy and Maquiladoras, Bus. FRONTIER (Fed. Res. Bank
Dallas, El Paso Branch) Issue 1 (2001) (listing inputs as materials, parts, and machinery imported by
maquiladoras). Maquiladoras incorporate inputs into the finished products that maquiladoras subsequently
export. Id. [Note by comment author use the terms "inputs" and "components" interchangeably, but primarily,
authors use the term "inputs."]; see also Neville, Peterson & Williams, Mexico Facing New Era in 2001, J.
COM., Feb. 9, 2000, (Global Commerce), at 12 (defining inputs as parts, components, packaging, or machinery
used to produce goods for export); GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33, 39 (itemizing duty-free
treatment to include import on parts, components, and other inputs). The Mexican government removed tariffs
from inputs, parts, and components. Id. at 39; David W. Eaton, Transformation of the Mexican Maquiladora
Industry: The Driving Force Behind the Creation of a NAFTA Regional Economy, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
747, 747 (1997) (explaining that manufacturing firms import raw materials, parts, and components (inputs) duty
free).
20. See Eaton, supra note 19, at 748 (identifying temporary importation of inputs, without taxes, as the
most important benefit for manufacturers).
21. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 6 (explaining that the term maquiladora loosely
refers to any subsidiary plant of a foreign company involved in export from Mexico). The GAO report uses the
term to define those maquiladoras that officially register with the Mexican government. Id.
22. See Chiang-feng Lin, Investment in Mexico: A Springboard Toward the NAFTA Market-An Asian
Perspective, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG., 73, 109-10 (1996) (stipulating that investors must obtain a permit
from the Mexican Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development ("SECOFI")). To qualify for registration
maquiladoras must generate employment, contribute foreign currency, foster the integration of Mexican
industry, and facilitate technology transfers. Id. at 110. After registration, the maquiladora can proceed with
temporary, duty-free importation of inputs for production. Id. Registration permits qualified maquiladoras to
import inputs temporarily, for manufacturing, without paying customs duties. Id. at 110-11. Mexican Customs
requires maquiladoras to post a bond, and the government can use the bond money if the maquiladoras fail to
re-export the goods, as required by the law. Id. at 11; see also Sandra L. Shippey & Patrick W. Martin, Legal
and Practical Issues Involved with Maquiladora Financing, 8 NAFrA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 253, 263 (itemizing
additional requirements for registering a maquiladora with the Mexican government).
23. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 6 (enumerating the various key benefits
maquiladoras receive after registration with the Mexican government).
24. See id. at 14 (detailing the history of production for maquiladoras). The maquiladora industry
increased production by 197 percent from January 1993 until its peak in October 2000. Id.
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, several countries in Europe, as well as the
United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, all established maquiladoras in
Mexico.25 There are several reasons why foreign investors locate maquiladoras in
Mexico. First, Mexico's proximity to the United States makes it a primary target
for foreign investors who wish to take advantage of the U.S. market.26 Mexico's
proximity to the United States attracts investors that rely on "just-in-time"
shipping, 27 a process that quickly moves the input from the maquiladora to a
company's assembly plant in the United States.2' The just-in-time system reduces
inventory to a minimal level by producing and delivering goods on an as-needed
basis. 29 For example, manufacturers such as Sanyo make 5.5 million televisions a
year primarily for Wal-Mart stores located inside the United States.3° Sanyo's
production system utilizes just-in-time shipping to divide production between
Tijuana and Arkansas.' Accordingly, other countries that are more remote, such
as those located in Asia, find it impossible to compete with Mexico's expedited
system.32
Second, Mexico's North American location enabled inclusion in the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),33 which removed many of the
trade barriers to investment and trade between Mexico, the United States, and
Canada. The implementation of NAFTA created the world's largest single
market for goods and capital.35 Since NAFTA's implementation, Mexican exports
to Canada and the United States have increased by 225 percent.36 NAFTA
25. See id. at 5 (explaining that in the 1980s Europe and Japan joined the United States in establishing
maquiladoras in Mexico). Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese maquiladoras first began leaving Mexico after the
implementation of Article 303. Id. at 36; see also infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text (discussing Article
303).
26. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 37 (noting Mexico's unique competitive advantage
because of its location bordering the United States); see also Sandoval, supra note 14, at ID (indicating that
economic analysts cite Mexico's proximity to the United States as the most important reason for locating
businesses in Mexico).
27. See Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT-Bus. LATIN AM., Feb. 24,
2003 (stating that just-in-time shipping is an important factor for many manufacturers and their suppliers).
28. Id.; Elisabeth Malkin, Manufacturing Jobs are Exiting Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at 1.
29. See Lin, supra note 22, at 114 n.248 (indicating that low quantities of inventory reduce maquiladora
production costs and make the manufactured products more competitive in the market).
30. Malkin, supra note 28, at 1.
31. See id. at I (explaining how Mexico benefits from its ability to offer just-in-time shipping).
32. See Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27 (providing that Toyota Motors will soon start
producing truck beds in Tijuana that will be shipped just-in-time to the company's assembly plant in California,
a distance short enough to make production in Asia impractical); see also Lin, supra note 22, at 114 n.248
(noting that suppliers must locate near manufacturing plants to take advantage of just-in-time shipping).
33. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA] (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
34. Harman, supra note 5, at 210-11; see Lin, supra note 22, at 116, 128 (stating NAFTA removed
tariff, quota, license, ground transportation, and technical barriers to trade). Mexico will benefit from a free
flow of products through the North American market. Id. at 116.
35. Harman, supra note 5, at 211.
36. See Antonio 0. Garza, Jr., A Letter from the Ambassador, Export America, Nov. 2003, available at
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outlines trade rules between various industries, including transportation, auto
parts, textiles, apparel, energy, and environmental protections.37 In addition,
NAFTA defines customs procedures, barriers to trade, and competition policy
investment." Furthermore, by 2009, NAFTA requires the elimination of all tariffs
on goods traded among NAFTA partners and prohibits the parties from
increasing or adopting additional tariffs on NAFTA goods.39 In addition, ten
years of NAFTA created a familiar environment for investors to conduct
business.4 ' Even with Mexico's many desirable attributes, investors are beginning
to relocate their manufacturing facilities to other countries. Maquiladoras began
to decline due to increased labor costs, fiscal uncertainty, and competition from
other countries' In 2000, President Fox confronted these challenges upon his
election.
B. Background of the Vicente Fox Presidency
The election of President Fox was a landmark in the history of Mexican
government. 4' For the first time in Mexico's history a political party other than
the PRI gained control of the presidency. Vicente Fox is the first elected
Mexican president from the PAN," an organization that has a conservative, pro-
business platform.4 ' The PRI monopolized the preceding seventy-years of the
Mexican presidency while focusing on developing a corporate economy with
limited involvement in the global world.46 This change in government signals a
http://www.export.gov/exportamerica/NewOpportunities/no-mexico1 103.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (highlighting the effects of NAFTA between the United States,
Mexico, and Canada).
37. See Harman, supra note 5, at 211 (listing specific provisions included in the NAFTA agreement).
38. Id. at 211.
39. See Lin, supra note 22, at 74, 119 (adding that by 2009, fifteen years after NAFTA's 1994 effective
date, all products traded within the NAFTA market will receive duty-free entry if the products have a NAF'A
origin). NAFTA will phase out tariffs over a fifteen-year period between 1994 and 2008. Id.
40. See Alan M. Field, Headed South; The Economy and China's Emergence as a Low-Cost
Manufacturing Center are Taking Toll on U.S.-Mexico Trade, J. COM., Apr. 14, 2003, at 19 (commenting that
NAFTA has educated Mexico on trade and fostered investor familiarity with Mexico).
41. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 14; see also Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18
(noting the underlying challenges for maquiladoras in Mexico); Paul Day, Mexico Struggles With Declining
Industrial Competitiveness, MARKET NEWS INT'L, May 13, 2003 (stating that the number of maquiladora plants
has dropped 6.4 percent a year since 1999).
42. See Fox Wins, supra note 5 (elaborating on the end of the PRI's seventy-one year dynasty).
43. See id. (explaining Fox's is victory was historical and the cleanest election in Mexico's history).
Previous elections have exhibited fraudulent results. Id.
44. See Guy Poitras, The Rise of the PAN, 9 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 271, 272 (providing a
background on the formation of the PAN in 1939); see also Wise, supra note 4, at 284 (defining the PAN as a
center-right political party). The PAN is conservative and entertains a business-oriented constituency. Id. at 292.
The 2002 PAN candidate, President Fox, attracted younger, largely urban, better-educated, middle-class voters.
Id. at 303; see also Mexican Political Parties, supra note 4, at 12A (classifying the PAN as pro-Catholic).
45. See Harman, supra note 5, at 208 (summarizing Vicente Fox's political career).
46. See David Hale, Mexico Needs a Chinese Shock, FIN. TIMES (London), July 9, 2003, at 13
(identifying the PRI's focus during its domination of the government).
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shift in the focus of Mexico's economic policy." Investors need to be aware of
the implications of this shift and the impact on the future of foreign investment in
Mexico. 48 President Fox pledged to "jump-start the economy" by increasing
foreign investment from $11 billion4 9 to $20 billion a year.5° Because of Mexico's
favorable location for investment, potential and current investors are closely
monitoring how Fox intends to develop and nurture foreign investment in
Mexico."
III. PROBLEMS FACED BY PRESIDENT VICENTE Fox THAT AFFECT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN MEXICO
Although Mexico is attractive to investors, President Fox faced complex
foreign investment issues. First, the maquiladoras' minimalist taxation regime,
which controlled for thirty years, began to change in the 1990s.52 Several laws
spurred this change, including the permanent establishment tax53 and Article
303. . Second, the political climate in Mexico, which includes a history of
corruption and present day extreme political party conflict, influences the
government's approach towards maquiladoras.55 Finally, Mexico's relationship
with the United States, and competition within the global economy to remain a
56choice manufacturing location, affects the maquiladora industry.
47. See James Pinkerton & John W. Gonzalez, Decision in Mexico; Texas Optimistic of 'New' Neighbor,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 2000, at A25 (reporting that business leaders are encouraged by Fox's campaign
pledge to further open Mexico's economy to free trade and foreign investment). However, another commentator
said that the presidential change would not change Mexico's economic policy. Id.
48. Cf Day, supra note 41 (implying that Fox's promise of a seven percent increase in foreign
investment seems unlikely because of a weak global economy and Mexico's lack of reform).
49. All references to currency in this comment are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
50. See Fox Wins, supra note 5 (reviewing the promises made by Fox during his presidential campaign);
Brendan M. Case, Fox Challenges 'Maverick' CEOs; President-elect of Mexico Seeks Economic Partners,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 2000, at ID (explaining that in addition to increasing foreign investment,
Fox wants to deepen trade relations).
51. See David Adams, Fox's Vision: Purer Mexico, A Unified North America, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2000, (National), at IA (commenting that foreign investors expressed concern regarding Fox's
confusing signals on economic policy). In addition, after the election analysts advised investors to reduce
investment in Mexico. Id.; see also Anthony DePalma, International Business; Mexico Victor Faces Choices on
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, § C, at 1 (relating that investors, analysts, and business leaders are
adjusting to the end of the PRI's seventy-one year one-party rule and questioning how Fox intends to handle the
complex economic issues facing Mexico).
52. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33 (highlighting the rapid evolution of maquiladora
tax law that took place in the 1990s).
53. See id. (noting that "permanent establishment" is a concept found in virtually all double taxation
treaties).
54. See infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text (reviewing the effects of the permanent establishment
and Article 303 provisions).
55. See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text (outlining the corrupt past in Mexico's government
and law enforcement and describing the legislative gridlock in Mexico's Congress).
56. See infra notes 120-75 and accompanying text (expanding on the relationship between the U.S.
economy and Mexico and Mexico's growing competition with other countries as a location for manufacturing).
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A. Foreign Investors Leery of Uncertain Tax Policies
Prior to the Fox presidency, foreign corporations realized major benefits by
establishing maquiladora operations in Mexico. 7 Two such benefits were duty-
free imports and minimal taxation." However, eroding tax benefits affected the
establishment of new companies within the maquiladora industry in Mexico.5 9
Since the 1960s, Mexico taxed maquiladoras on a low percentage of the
maquiladora's fixed assets located in Mexico.6' In 1998, Mexico changed the tax
laws to label maquiladoras as permanent establishments61 in Mexico.6' By repealing
the coveted "temporary" status of maquiladoras, this new identification removed a
key incentive for foreign investors to conduct maquiladora operations in Mexico. 6 If
Mexico begins taxing maquiladoras as permanent establishments, it would make
countries, such as China, more appealing because permanent establishment tax laws
would require companies to pay higher taxes.' Characterization as a permanent
establishment and the accompanying threat of the permanent establishment tax
particularly concerned the United States since ninety-five percent of maquiladoras
are U.S. owned. In addition, U.S. owned maquiladoras face double taxation by the
57. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33 (explaining that low taxes were the primary
benefit for maquiladoras).
58. See id. (noting that until the mid-1990s maquiladoras enjoyed virtual freedom from taxation).
59. See id. at 28 (explaining that International Trade Commission research shows a growing number of
textile and apparel products being produced in China instead of Mexico).
60. Michael C. McClintock, Sunrise Mexico; Sunset NAFTA-Centric FTAA-What Next and Why?, 7
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 81 (2000); James F. Smith & Chris Kraul, U.S., Mexico Reach Deal on Factory Tax;
Business: Accord Boosts Latin Nation's Revenue while Temporarily Heading off Double Levies Against
American-Owned Firms, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at Ai; see GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33
(stating that the maquiladora tax regime remained constant for thirty years until the 1990s); see also Kevin G.
Hall, Maquiladoras Seek Tax Rule Relief, J. COM., Jan. 25, 1996, at 3A (describing asset taxes as taxes on
plants and equipment used in Mexico).
61. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that permanent establishment companies
may be taxed in the host country). A permanent establishment is typically a branch of a parent company from
one country doing business in another "host" country, and is subject to taxes in both countries. Id.; see also
Mauricio Monroy, Harmonizing the Mexican Tax System with the Goals of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 746 (1998) (explaining the elements that create classification
as a permanent establishment). Acting through dependent agents in Mexico who have power to conduct
business also creates a permanent establishment. Id. Mexican tax law defines a permanent establishment as an
entity that partly or entirely conducts business in Mexico. Id.
62. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33 (indicating that Mexico adopted the permanent
establishment concept as a part of its income tax law in 1981 but exempted maquiladoras from the tax until
1998). Mexico affirmed the permanent establishment tax in the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty of 1992. Id.
63. See McClintock, supra note 60, at 81 (noting that the permanent establishment tax means
maquiladora plants could face the average corporate rate taxes of thirty-four percent).
64. See also GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 28 (examining the differences between Mexico
and China in the manufacturing industry). Corporate income taxes for Mexican-based maquiladoras are higher
than China. Id.; see also Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18 (relating that the permanent establishment change to
the Mexican tax code propelled the maquiladora industry into fiscal confusion with regard to income and
customs taxation).
65. John Moody, Maquiladoras' Tax Status Extended, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl; see
Daniel McCosh, Confusion Greets New Tax Rules for Maquilas, J. COM., Feb. 14, 2000, (World Trade), at 3
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United States and Mexican government.66 For that reason, the United States lobbied
the Mexican government to delay the treatment of maquiladoras as permanent
61establishments. In 2000, Mexico conceded to the United States and provided
maquiladoras with two taxing options to avoid the permanent establishment 
tax.68
Subsequently, in 2002, Mexico renewed this taxing option and the United States
agreed to provide a foreign tax credit to U.S. firms that paid maquiladora income
taxes to Mexico.69
However, investors complain that the application process for the tax
exemption is time consuming. 0 Despite the complaints, Mexico refuses to change
the permanent establishment treatment referenced in Mexico's tax law until at
least 2007. 7 Ultimately, investors frequently cite the permanent establishment tax
as a cause for uncertainty regarding investment in the maquiladora industry
because it makes long-term financial planning impossible.72 This continuing
uncertainty is a significant deterrent to further maquiladora investment in
Mexico.73
In addition to the permanent establishment tax, another tax law that affects
foreign investment in Mexico is Article 303 of NAFTA.74 This provision affects
maquiladoras that rely on non-North American inputs because Article 303
(arguing that taxing maquiladoras as permanent establishments would prevent the industry from thriving and
generating significant trade between the United States and Mexico).
66. See Cahas & Coronado, supra note 18 (illustrating the double taxation facing maquiladora
corporations which maintain parent companies in the United States and a subsidiary maquiladora in Mexico).
67. See Andrea Mandel-Campbell, Worries Persist After Tax Decision on Maquiladoras, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 1, 1999, (World News), at 4 (revealing that negotiations between the United States and Mexico
regarding the permanent establishment tax spanned six months).
68. See McClintock, supra note 60, at 81 (reporting that Mexico and the United States had to
compromise on tax issues in order to preserve the maquiladora industry). Mexico assented to continue taxing
maquiladoras on a percentage of their fixed asset value but raised this percentage to increase tax revenue. Id.;
see also Shippey & Martin, supra note 22 (referring to the requirements maquiladoras need to comply with in
order to circumvent the permanent establishment tax). Instead of the permanent establishment tax, the
maquiladora must pay the greater of 6.9 percent of its assets or 6.5 percent of its costs; or, the maquiladora must
secure an advanced pricing agreement from the Mexican government. Id.
69. See Shippey & Martin, supra note 22 at 276 (explaining that the agreement between Mexico and the
United States extended beyond 2002); see also GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 40 (stating the
foreign tax credit was the result of a Second Additional Protocol to the United States-Mexico tax treaty).
70. See Caias & Coronado, supra note 18 (noting that some maquiladoras have waited as long as three
years to know their tax liability). Increased tax uncertainty existed because the exemptions for United States
maquiladoras were set to expire in December 2002. Id.
71. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 40 (summarizing the agreements reached between
the United States and Mexico regarding the permanent establishment tax).
72. Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33 (identifying
the change in the permanent establishment provision as the most significant tax change in thirty years).
73. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 33; see Cahias & Coronado, supra note 18 at 5-7 (arguing
that prolonging the fiscal uncertainty until 2007, in essence, passes the predicament onto the next
administration).
74. See NAFTA, art. 303, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (listing the specific statutory requirements for
compliance); see also GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 34 (detailing the background of Article 303 of
NAFTA).
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eliminates duties for imported inputs from a non-NAFTA country.75 NAFTA
envisioned a significant change in the maquiladora model.76  Originally,
maquiladoras provided duty drawbacks77 for inputs imported to Mexico from any
source, including non-NAFTA countries, but Article 303 repealed the
maquiladora benefit that permitted choosing inputs from any country." NAFTA
scheduled the law for implementation seven years after signing the treaty.79
Article 303 mandated that by the end of 2000, manufacturers could only exempt
North American inputs from taxes.80 However, compliance with Article 303 was
impossible for all maquiladoras because at the outset, not every maquiladora in
Mexico is North American." Furthermore, this provision essentially eliminated
duty-free imports from non-NAFTA treaty countries. 2 As a result, this NAFTA
provision impairs maquiladoras that rely on non-NAFTA suppliers for inputs.83
To complicate the situation, Mexico did not sufficiently prepare for future
reliance on domestic suppliers during the seven-year grace period, as intended by
Article 303.s4 The phasing out of this NAFTA benefit negatively affects Mexico's
competitive edge over other leading countries of export. s5 However, in response
to Article 303, the Mexican Economic Ministry instituted a promotional program,
exempting maquiladoras from paying taxes on inputs generated in North
America.86 The Economic Ministry designed these exemptions to encourage
maquiladoras to comply with Article 303.87 The network of North American
suppliers and inputs, contemplated by Article 303, requires significant changes in
maquiladora input sources, particularly for Asian maquiladoras.88 Despite the
promotions put in place by Mexico, Article 303 eroded the competition among
maquiladoras that depend on inputs from outside North America.89
75. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 34 (citing NAFTA as a major factor in the decrease
in maquiladora production and employment).
76. Id.
77. See id. (defining "duty drawback" as the refund, waiver, or reduction of customs on imported goods).
78. See id. (contrasting the maquiladora duty drawback system with NAFTA's duty drawback system).
79. See id. (acknowledging that duty drawbacks for inputs of non-NAFTA origin ended January 1,2001).
80. See Miguel Jauregui Rojas, Review of Legal Developments in Mexico: 2000-2001, 10 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 3, 12 (2002) (referring to the implications of Article 303).
81. See id. at 12 (relating that non-North American investors continue to rely on inputs from non-North
American countries that do not receive the tax exemption).
82. See Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18, at 7 (discussing the effects of Article 303).
83. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 34 (drawing attention to the closure of some
maquiladora firms).
84. See id. at 34 (explaining that inputs from a non-NAFTA country are now taxed).
85. See id. (acknowledging that Article 303 affects maquiladoras that rely on non-NAFTA suppliers).
86. See Rojas, supra note 80, at 12 (illustrating that the Mexican government issued promotional
programs to avoid financially destroying maquiladoras that rely on non-North American inputs).
87. See id. at 12 (explaining that the tax benefits will encourage maquiladoras to use North American inputs).
88. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 35 (reporting that Japanese and other Asian-owned
maquiladoras rely on inputs from Asia); see also id. at 36 (listing Asian companies that have left Mexico).
89. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 35-36 (citing some maquiladoras as having cost
increases in production of up to twenty percent).
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B. Issues in Mexico's Political Climate
While the problems brought by Article 303 loomed in the background for
seven years, Mexico's government did not respond swiftly to this or other
problems that arose in the maquiladora industry.9° Mexican business executives
accuse the Fox Administration of lacking vigor in pursuing more foreign
investing in Mexico.9 Consequently, maquiladora investment declined and
immediate government action is necessary in order for the industry to regain its
competitive edge.92
The history of corruption in the police force as well as the government makes
foreign investment difficult to address. 93 Mexican business representatives argue
that in order to remain competitive, Fox needs to stop corruption." The vice-
president of Latin American operations for a Chicago-based industrial and
chemical company doing extensive business in Mexico, recently stated, "Fox will
have to address the crime situation, which has an impact on attracting foreign
investment."95  Corruption also affects spending because the World Bank
96
estimates that corruption costs Mexico nine percent of its Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP").97 In addition to the waste of capital, corruption results in unsafe
streets, which discourage potential investors.
90. See id. at 40 (noting that the Mexican government was slow to respond to the maquiladora
challenges). The Mexican government initially took a "wait and see" approach to the maquiladoras decline, in
belief that they would be replaced by higher paying and more profitable industries. Id. In 2002, maquiladora
representatives finally pressured the government to implement changes. Id.; see also Malkin, supra note 28, at I
(acknowledging the Mexican government was slow to resolve the confusion over the new duties assessed on
Asian components because of Article 303 and the tax status of maquiladora plants).
91. See Juan Forero, Mexico Manufacturers Lose Business to China, A New King of Low-Cost Plants
Emerges, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, (Finance), at 14 (criticizing the government's failure to respond
to the lower labor costs in China, which have surmounted Mexico's competitiveness).
92. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 40 (indicating that the Mexican government needs to
reform energy, infrastructure, and labor for the success of maquiladoras).
93. See Paulette L. Stenzel, The U.S. and Mexico Sin Fronteras-Without Borders: Sustainable
Development from a Local Perspective, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 441, 478 & n.266, 490
(2002) (noting the corruption that endured for seventy-one years within the PRI, the Mexican government, and
the police force).
94. See Forero, supra note 91, at 14 (stating that corruption needs to be addressed in order to remain
competitive, since Chinese labor costs are about one-fourth lower than Mexican labor costs).
95. Weiner & Gori, supra note 8.
96. See The World Bank, What is the World Bank, (2004), at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNALEXTAB OUTUS/contentMDK:20040558-menuPK:34559pagePK:34542-piPK:36600--theSitePK:297
08,00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining the function of the
World Bank). The World Bank includes 184 countries that provide low-interest loans, interest-free credit, and grants to
developing countries. Id.
97. Opening Mexico; Don't Overlook Legacy of Transparency, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 22, 2003,
at 16A (reporting that the cost of corruption is more than the cost of education in Mexico) Id.
98. See Stenzel, supra note 93, at 493 (reporting that in 2002, private Mexican corporate executives
hired former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to advise Mexico City on reducing crime). The
executives are paying Giuliani and his associates 4.3 million U.S. dollars to make Mexico City a safe place to
do business. Id.
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Along with the history of corruption, President Fox also faces the challenge
of a gridlocked and hostile Congress99 that refuses to pass his legislation.' °° The
PRI members in Congress consistently rally against Fox's plans and thwart his
agenda.0°  Furthermore, the Democratic Revolutionary Party ("PRD")'0 2 is a left
wing, liberal party that conflicts with Fox's party, the PAN, and its right wing,
conservative philosophy.' 3 For instance, the PRD's animosity toward Fox
culminated in a 2003 incident where the PRD refused to pass the national
budget. '0 Even the PAN, Fox's own political party, expressed dissatisfaction
with several of Fox's policy decisions.' 5 In addition, the PRI, PAN, and PRD are
struggling with intra-party conflict. °6 Moreover, the Green Ecologist Party of
Mexico ("PVEM")'s '°7 formal withdrawal of support for President Fox further
compounded the political tension in Mexico. °8
99. Mention of Congress, congressional, or legislature in this Comment is in reference to the Mexican
Congress unless otherwise noted.
100. See Hale, supra note 46, at 13 (noting that Congress and Fox have reached an impasse concerning
proposals to broaden the tax base, open the energy industry to foreign investment, and to liberalize the labor
market). But see infra notes 180-219 and accompanying text (outlining the bills passed or amended by Congress
which greatly affect the maquiladora industry).
101. Cf Tim Weiner, Corruption and Waste Bleed Mexico's Oil Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at
AI (providing a background to the corruption associated with the PRI and Mexico's oil company, Pemex). To
defend the PRI's remaining control over Pemex, the PRI resists every effort to reform Pemex. Id. The PRI
refuses to cooperate with Fox and change the Mexican Constitution to permit foreign investment in Pemex. Id.
102. See Wise, supra note 4, at 288 (commenting that in 1982, disaffected PRI party members formed
the PRD political party). In 1988, the reigning PRI faced its first credible challenge by the PRD party for the
presidency. Id. at 288-89. At that time, the middle class and educated urban voters voted for the PRD candidate.
Id. at 292. The former PRI members, who launched the PRD party, originated primarily from the disgruntled
left wing ranks of the PRI. Id. at 292. The 1994 presidential elections revealed that the PRD party declined in
popularity because PRI political decisions had won back the vote of the poor. Id. at 296. However, in 1997, the
voters changed again, and the southern, poor, and agricultural-producing states sided with the PRD. Id. at 303;
see also Mexican Political Parties, supra note 4, at 12A (labeling the PRD as center-left on economic and social
issues); cf M. Delal Baer, Fox Faces Thunder on the Left, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at MI (asserting the PRI
has an ally with the left wing PRD).
103. See Michael Stott, Mexico Celebrates 'People's Victory', HERALD (Glasgow), July 8, 1997, at 10
(stating that in Mexico's July 1997 election, the right wing PAN received twenty-seven percent of the votes,
and the left wing PRD collected twenty-six percent of the votes).
104. See David Gaddis Smith, Mexico City Mayor Looking Like Successor to Fox; Lopez Obrador Very
Popular in Nation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 16, 2003, at A19 (recounting that the PRD believes that it
works to its electoral advantage to remain in extreme opposition to the PAN and Fox); see also Rojas, supra
note 80, at 6 (asserting that the PRD criticizes the President's policies and decisions). For example, the PRD
rejected an airport in Mexico City that would have been a principal source of growth. Id.; Dismal Year Ends
with Sensible Budget, LATIN AM. ECON. & Bus., Dec. 2003 (observing that Congress finally passed the 2004
budget on December 31, 2003).
105. See Wise, supra note 4, at 305 (indicating the primary complaints of the PAN party against
President Fox). The PAN party objects to President Fox's desire to deal directly with the public, that he
appointed a diverse cabinet, and his independent stance on policy issues) Id.
106. See id. at 305 (outlining the tensions within the PRI, PAN, and PRD parties since the 2000
elections).
107. See Mexican Political Parties, supra note 4, at 12A (stating that the PVEM formed in 1991 and
promotes environmental and youth issues).
108. See Rojas, supra note 80, at 6 (explaining that the PVEM dissolved its union between the PAN and
President Fox).
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In 2000, the PRI opposition only held a slight majority in the Mexican
Congress.' 9 After the recent congressional elections in July 2003, the PRI
strengthened its position in Congress.' ° Presently, 282 members of Congress
belong to the PRI, and the PAN holds 197 members."' Even though the PRI has
the most members, it lacks a sufficient number to control the Congress. ' 2 Since
the PRD and the PVEM also now hold a significant number of representatives,
enacting legislation is challenging at best." 3 For example, the recent proposed
energy and labor reform bills were unsuccessful in legislature. 4  The Fox
Administration introduced an energy reform bill in August 2002, but it stalled in
Congress.'15 Legislators opposed aspects of the bill dealing with privatization
because it would require amending the Mexican constitution." 6 President Fox
also introduced a labor reform package to Congress, representing a compromise
between labor groups, business, and government, but Congress refused to pass
the bill. ' 7 As of January 2004, Mexico's sharply divided Congress persists in
refusing to enact fiscal, energy, and labor reforms and permits Fox to only pass a
limited number of laws regarding foreign investment."' Thus, Congress prevents
Fox from passing much-needed reforms and causes foreign investors to invest in
other countries."9
109. See A New Sun; Overview, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 26, 2000, (Special), at 2 (listing the breakdown of
representatives in the 628 member Congress). The PRI, PAN, PRD, and PVEM hold 271, 252, 66, and 22 seats,
respectively. Id. The bicameral Mexican Congress includes 500 seats for the Chamber of Deputies and 128 seats
for the Senate. Id.
110. See John Authers, PRI's Gains in Mexico Poll Herald Horsetrading with Fox Former Ruling Party,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 15, 2003, (The Americas), at 3 [hereinafter PRI's Gains in Mexico] (reporting that
the Federal Electoral Institute announced that Fox's party, the PAN, has a minority in Congress).
111. See Composicin de la Cdmara por Partido [Composition of the Chamber by Party], available at
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter Composition of the Chamber by Party] (listing the current number of members of the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies); see also Grupos Parlamentarios [Parliamentary Groups], available at http://www.
senado.gob.mx/legislatura.php?ver=grupos&lng=es (last visited Feb. 9, 2004) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Parliamentary Groups] (portraying the current makeup of the Mexican
Senate).
112. See PRI's Gains in Mexico, supra note 110, at 3.
113. See Composition of the Chamber by Party, supra note 111 (stating that in the Chamber of Deputies
the PRD holds 95 seats and the PVEM holds 17 seats); see also Parliamentary Groups, supra note 111
(acknowledging that in the Mexican Senate the PRD holds 16 seats and the PVEM holds 5 seats).
114. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 40-41 (highlighting examples of conflict in the
Mexican Congress).
115. See id. at 40 (stating that Congress refused to pass the bill even though government officials and
industry representatives stress that Mexico has an urgent need for energy reform).
116. Id.
117. Id.at4l.
118. See Jason Lange, Analysts: Mexn [sic] CenBank's Dollar Sales to Boost Peso, MARKET NEWS
INT'L, Jan. 21, 2004 (noting that since 2000, Congress has prevented President Fox from passing fiscal, energy,
and labor reforms); see also infra notes 180-219 and accompanying text (outlining the bills passed or amended
by Congress and Fox that greatly affect the maquiladora industry).
119. See Lange, supra note 118 (noting that economists say reforms would reduce labor and energy
costs and spur economic growth).
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C. Mexico and the Global Economy
The Fox Administration and the Mexican Congress are aware that the United
States economy directly affects the Mexican economy.'20 From 1994 through
2001, the United States accounted for sixty-seven percent of the total foreign
investment in Mexico.'21 The maquiladora industry is especially sensitive to the
economic situation of the United States. 2  First, ownership and production
directly connect U.S. owned maquiladoras with U.S. companies. 123 Second, in
2001 alone, maquiladoras exported ninety-eight percent of their products to the
United States.' 24 Third, maquiladoras import seventy-nine percent of inputs from
the United States. 2 Accordingly, a slowdown or improvement of the United
States economy significantly affects the maquiladora industry.26 To illustrate, the
2001 recession in the United States caused a 400,000-job loss in the maquiladora
industry. 12 In addition, 420 maquiladora plants closed between 2001 and 2002.28
Furthermore, the recession in the United States decreased maquiladora imports of
U.S. inputs. 29 However, the U.S. economy is not the only global influence on the
maquiladora industry.
Investors are also concerned with the appreciation of the Mexican peso. 30
Since 1998 and continuing after President Fox's election, the Mexican peso has
steadily increased in value.' However, a stronger currency translates to higher
120. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 26; see Brendan M. Case, Moves by Telmex, TV Azteca
boost Mexico's Bolsa, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 8, 2000, at I ID (asserting that the U.S. economy has a
"profound influence on Mexico").
121. See Robert Donnelly, Dealing with the Rising Sun, Bus. MEXICO, May 1, 2003, available at 2003
WL 6179595 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that Mexico received $91 billion in foreign
direct investment from 1994 to 2001).
122. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 26.
123. Id. at 9 (listing top U.S. firms that maintain maquiladoras in Mexico). Delphi, RCA, Ford Motor
Company, Tyco, General Electric, General Instruments, Johnson & Johnson, and ITT all are maquiladora
employers. Id. Seventy-nine of the top one-hundred maquiladora employers are from the United States. Id.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 26, 57 (citing the U.S. economic slowdown as a significant determinant of a decline in
maquiladora employment).
127. See David Bacon, Maquiladora Bosses Play the China Card: Companies in Mexico Threaten to
Relocate to China, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 20 (providing the decreased employment statistics
according to Marco Antonio Tomas of Mexico City's Center for Labor research).
128. Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18, at 5.
129. See John D. Breidenstine, Best Prospect Sectors in Mexico, U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE (Nov.
2003), at http://www.export.gov/exportamerica/NewOpportunities/no-mexico_1103.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (mentioning that in 2002, the slowdown of the U.S.
consumer electronics market caused a decrease in Mexican assembly). Maquiladoras import U.S. inputs to use
for assembly into finished products to export. Id.
130. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining Mexico's appreciated peso has eroded
its competitiveness in the maquiladora industry).
131. See id. at 31-32 (graphing the real dollar exchange rate of the Mexican Peso from 1995 through
2002); see also John Authers, Investors Ride the Mexican Trade Wave: Foreign Money is Flooding into a
Booming Economy, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 15, 2002, (Survey-FTFM), at 7 (observing that in late 1998, the
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operating costs for maquiladora owners.'32 Historically, growth periods for
maquiladoras revolved around a depreciated peso because a devalued peso
helped maquiladoras control costs. '33 Thus, maquiladora owners relied on peso
devaluations to absorb higher labor costs.'34 Prior to the Fox presidency, the
government steadily devalued the peso to make Mexican exports more
competitive and enhance the country's position as a low-cost manufacturing
location.' 35 With the now higher peso, maquiladoras are sensitive to the peso
exchange rate because they incur production costs in pesos.'
36 An appreciation of
the real exchange rate of the peso makes goods exported from Mexico more
expensive.'37 This results in investors choosing to invest elsewhere after
comparing Mexico's currency with other countries like China, whose currency
has decreased in value within the past five years. 38 This decrease allows China to
compete more effectively for foreign investors in contrast with Mexico.'
39
• 140
To offset the rising peso Mexico needs to update its infrastructure, energy,
and water supply to remain competitive for foreign investment. 
'4' Mexican
business representatives urge Fox to cut taxes, lower electricity costs, and
improve roads.14  However, energy and infrastructure issues are difficult to
address when Mexican taxpayers are accustomed to paying little or no taxes to
Mexican peso measured 10.8 pesos to the U.S. dollar). In April 2002, the peso valued nine pesos to the dollar.
ld.; GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 31 (stipulating that the peso has consistently appreciated against
the dollar in real terms since 1998). This trend of a strong peso has continued, even through the maquiladora
decline. Id.
132. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 31.
133. See id. at 30-31 (noting that in 1984, a devalued peso prompted a three-year surge in U.S.
automotive industry investments in maquiladora plants). In addition, the peso devaluation in 1994 spurred the
expansion of Mexico's maquiladoras until 1999. Id.; see also Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18 (stating that
Mexico's recent macroeconomic stability has kept the peso strong).
134. See Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18, at 5 (stipulating maquiladoras can no longer expect a
depressed peso to offset increasing labor costs); see also Rojas, supra note 80, at 11 (addressing the issue that
companies need to control labor and management in order to keep up with an increased peso).
135. See Martyn Warwick, Mexico is Poised for Revolution; Telecommunications, INFO. ACCESS
COMPANY, May 1995, at 38 (relating that International Technology Consultants predict that devaluation of the
peso will make Mexican exports more competitive); see also Wise, supra note 4, at 288 (stipulating that the
Mexican government devalued the peso to expand exports).
136. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 58 & n.4 (discussing maquiladoras with products
destined for the United States). Goods exported to the United States generate revenue in dollars. Id.
137. See id. at 58 (articulating that goods made in the United States are less expensive as compared to
Mexico when the peso is elevated).
138. Id.at3l.
139. See id. (comparing the depreciation of the Chinese currency, the yuan, with the Mexican peso).
140. Roads, ports, and airports need to be modernized.
141. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 40; Robin Emmott, Potent Peso is Put through its
Paces, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1, 2002; see Lin, supra note 22, at 93 n.1 10 (explaining that a decreased water supply
especially constrains the textile industry, which requires sufficient water for the dyeing, printing, and finishing
process).
142. See Forero, supra note 91, at 14 (identifying taxes, electricity, and roads as problems to address to
remain competitive with China).
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support their government.14 In addition, funding for infrastructure and energy
reform has encountered stiff resistance in Congress.'" Currently, middle class
professionals shoulder the majority of the tax burden of Mexico, while the
industries pay virtually no taxes. 4' As a result of the low taxes, Mexico's
inadequate infrastructure pales in comparison with China's coastal ports, which
appeal to manufacturers. 46 Poor infrastructure is particularly harmful for the
maquiladora industry' 7  Investors have elected to locate operations near
Mexico's major cities or the United States-Mexico border, which avails
maquiladoras of improved infrastructure.' s4  With respect to electricity, Mexico's
state-run company charges more for electricity than the United States and
substantially more than China. 1
49
Competition with other countries has increased as many nations around the
world have adopted export-oriented manufacturing plants similar to Mexico's
maquiladoras.' 5° For example, India and Pakistan offer export industries fiscal
and institutional incentives, as well as fully developed infrastructure in the form
of industrial parks. 5 ' In addition, El Salvador has cheaper labor costs and less-
stringent regulations than Mexico,'52 while both the Dominican Republic and
Honduras have lower manufacturing wages than Mexico.' 3 However, out of all
the country-competitors, China is the most worrisome for Mexico in the area of
manufacturing.'54 The maquiladora industry's decline in employment is due
143. See Day, supra note 41 (quoting Finance Ministry Spokesman, Raul Ostos-Martfnez, who urges
that the government needs to create a new tax culture to accustom Mexicans to paying more taxes); see also
Wise, supra note 4, at 305 (indicating that in 2000, Mexico needed tax reform because public revenues
stagnated at fifteen to eighteen percent of GDP).
144. See Day, supra note 41 (providing a background of Mexico's political climate). After seventy years
of the same political party in power, Congress is unaccustomed to negotiating to pass legislation. Id.
145. See Rojas, supra note 80, at 13 (demanding that industries contribute to Mexico's tax burden).
146. See Field, supra note 40, at 19 (comparing China's infrastructure to Mexico's remote locations,
which have poor access to major land routes, railroads, and seaports). Although major routes have improved,
secondary roads remain very slow for truckers to traverse. Id.
147. See Lin, supra note 22, at 93 (stating that maquiladora investors find it easier and less expensive to
truck or ship materials across the border than to transport goods inside Mexico).
148. Id. at 94.
149. Ferris, supra note 11, at 4H.
150. See Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18, at 8 (articulating the challenge of global competition for the
Mexican maquiladora industry).
151. See id. (analyzing the benefits of manufacturing plants located in other countries besides Mexico).
152. See Forero, supra note 91, at 14 (reporting that Gicsa Corporation, a blue jeans manufacturer for
Target and American Eagle Outfitters, is considering moving to El Salvador where labor is twenty-two percent
less expensive).
153. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 28 & n.21 (enumerating 2002 statistics, which show
Mexican workers earning $2.50 an hour, Dominican workers earning $1.50 an hour, and Honduran workers
earning $1.30 an hour). Mexican wages are almost sixty-seven percent higher than the Dominican Republic and
ninety-two percent higher than Honduras. Id.
154. See id. at 26 (discussing the majority of industry association representatives who referred to the role
of China in the decline of maquiladoras); see also Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18, at 8 (listing the different
plants that have transferred from Mexico to China). In 2002, Royal Philips Electronics moved its plant and 900
jobs to China, and Arneses de Judrez, an automobile parts maquiladora, transferred to China and laid off 800
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partially to investors transferring production to Asia.'5 In particular, China boasts
many benefits for foreign investors that are lacking in Mexico, including lower
labor, electricity, and water costs.'5 6 China also offers investors lower, more
competitive corporate income tax rates.'5 7 In 2001, China joined the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). 18  This made China more attractive for foreign
investment because China now has lower tariffs on exported goods by virtue of
the Most Favored Nation status.
59
In addition to lower tax rates and WTO membership, the non-democratic
Chinese government is easily able to govern globalization.'
6° In Mexico,
democracy and multi-party conflicts make it more difficult for the President and
Congress to agree on efforts to globalize.' 6' Previously, the one-party PRI control
made the Mexican Congress the equivalent of a rubber stamp on any legislation
the PRI wanted to enact.' 62 Currently, the tri-party control in Congress creates a
legislative gridlock because three strong parties make it difficult to obtain a
majority and pass needed legislation. 63 On the other hand, investors are mindful
of consumers who look down upon manufacturing performed in non-democratic
countries.' In 2003, the economy minister of Mexico, Fernando Canales, stated
Mexican workers. Id. Sanyo Electric Company also laid off 1,884 employees and relocated to China and
Indonesia. Id.
155. Hale, supra note 46, at 13.
156. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 28 (discussing the advantages China has over
Mexico); see also Malkin, supra note 28, at I (detailing China's benefits over Mexico, including a sophisticated
base of manufacturing suppliers, tax breaks, well-trained engineers, and efficient ports).
157. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 28.
158. Id.at26&n.18.
159. See Raj Bhala, Conference: Inerfaces: From International Trade to International Economic Law:
Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469, 1479-80
(reviewing the benefits of WTO membership). Most Favored Nation status removes the high tariffs China
previously faced when exporting goods. Id. at 1479. For example, in 1994, China produced one-seventh of the
world's clothing and shoes. Id. Until China entered the WTO, those goods would face tariffs as high as twenty-
three percent in the European Union. Id. WTO membership makes tariffs on those same shoes and clothes only
4.8 percent. Id. In 1994, the World Bank estimated that if China joined the WTO, it would obtain greater access
to foreign markets and would increase exports by thirty-eight percent. Id. at 1480.
160. See Hale, supra note 46, at 13 (relating that communism in China assists the country's global
expansion as a trading nation). Mexico can only meet China's challenge to foreign investment if the various
political parties in Mexico come to agreement. Id.
161. See id. (summarizing the major incidents in Mexico's political history). The Mexican Revolution
from 1910 to 1916 led to the one-party PRI government. Id. Now that a different political party controls the
presidency, Congress resists accepting the PAN and President Fox. Id. This could make President Fox
unproductive and unable to pass his legislation. Id.
162. See Wise, supra note 4, at 290-306 (contrasting Mexico's current gridlocked Congress with the PRI
era, where the Mexican Congress used its two-thirds majority to approve all of the PRI's proposed
constitutional amendments).
163. See id. at 306 (noting that the Mexican Congress closely scrutinizes and modifies all of the
presidential bills proposed by Fox). President Fox must fiercely negotiate to pass legislation. Id.
164. See Sandoval, supra note 14, at ID (quoting a U.S. official who recently told a group of U.S. and
Mexican business leaders that, "Mexico has two things China does not, the United States right next door and a
democracy.").
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that China does not respect human rights and is not a country with a solidpoliical and conoic ' • •165
political and economic institution. Nevertheless, despite the economy
minister's opinion of consumers, a Japanese electronics firm, TDK, transferred
its plants to China because Chinese laborers will work for one-third the cost of
Mexican wages, which translates to less-expensive products for consumers."
Cheap labor is also eclipsing the advantage of Mexico's close-proximity to the
United States because savings in labor expenses offset shipping costs fromC . 1 6 7
China. However, larger products still cost more to ship from China 61 Consequently,
for larger products, Mexico becomes more cost-efficient, notwithstanding higher labor
169expenses.
In contrast with labor groups in other countries, especially China, Mexico's
labor unions are demanding more benefits and higher wages.' 70 Various collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by labor unions are disastrous for Mexico's
ability to compete with other countries. The high wage and benefit increases
associated with collective bargaining agreements are problematic for Mexico's
economy because manufactures will choose to locate in countries without labor• 1 7 2
unions. Mexican workers are in jeopardy of losing their jobs to foreign
competition if they do not change their tactics towards employers. However,
the Mexican government disagrees on how to balance labor rights against
retaining employers. For instance, in 2001, Sony lowered wages and benefits to
165. Forero, supra note 91, at 14.
166. See Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27 (stating Mexican workers earn $1.47 per hour,
but Chinese workers will work for one-third of that wage). TDK transferred its plants to China in January 2003.
Id.; see also Mexico's Broken Dream, supra note 11, at 4H (noting that Chinese workers earn sixty-one cents
per hour, and Mexican manufacturing workers earn $2.08 per hour).
167. See Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27 (finding that China's less expensive operating
conditions more than compensate for the trans-Pacific shipping costs). Shipping in large volumes makes it more
economical. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. (relating that Pioneer, a Japanese electronics firm, produced its smaller car speakers in
Shanghai but kept its large, customized car speakers in Mexico). The cost of shipping the large speakers from
China was too expensive. Id.
170. See Toh Han Shih, Low Wages Help Region Maintain its Edge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 8,
2003, (Business Post), at 2 (asserting that China has no independent labor unions to struggle for higher wages).
171. See Rojas, supra note 80, at 3 (illustrating an example of the recent Volkswagen bargaining
agreement, which increased wages by fourteen percent, including benefits).
172. See id. at 3 (arguing that Mexican workers need to stop demanding salary increases in order to
preserve their employment).
173. See id. at 8 (stating that "Mexican workers are not productive in real terms or when compared to
labor in other countries."). In addition, aggressive labor unions threaten maquiladora existence in Mexico. Id.
174. See Bacon, supra note 127, at 20 (relating that the Coalition for Justice in the maquiladoras agrees
that lower wages are preferable to no employment). Workers face maquiladora neighborhoods with dilapidated
schools, hospitals, refuse collection, and sewer systems. Id. However, since companies threatened to take
investments to China, Fox proposed to amend the labor law to eliminate traditional worker protections. Id.; see
also Talli Nauman, Development in Mexico: As Established Policies Are Nurtured, the Hopes of Many
Mexicans Wither on the Vine, BORDERLINES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 1 (stating that analysts express serious concerns
about wages, working conditions, and training opportunities).
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workers under the threat of moving the entire manufacturing plant to China
altogether. 75 Mexicans conclude that employment in poor working conditions is
better than no employment.'7 6 Therefore, to prevent maquiladoras from closing
their plants in Mexico, President Fox has responded with several important laws.
IV. THE Fox ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
PROBLEMS IN MEXICO
President Fox has struggled to strengthen foreign investment in Mexico and
address the problems of the maquiladora industry 
since taking office in 2000.77
Although reforms are slow and laws are difficult to enact amidst Mexico's
splintered Congress,' 78 President Fox has managed to approve a number of laws,
which positively affected foreign investment in Mexico, particularly in the
maquiladora industry.'79 Specifically, President Fox addressed changes to tax
policies, Mexico's political climate, and Mexico's relationship with the global
economy.
A. Changes to Tax Policies
President Fox has successfully lowered taxes for maquiladoras by
establishing the Sectoral Promotion Program ("PROSEC"), the Information
Technology Agreement ("ITA Plus"), and the Temporary Importation Program
for the Production of Articles for Export or ("PITEX"). Fox has also passed laws
that combat the uncertainty surrounding the permanent establishment tax and
provide additional tax exemptions for maquiladoras.
First, in 2000, the Mexican legislature enacted PROSEC, which both reduces
tariffs for non-North American maquiladoras
'8 and offsets the negative effects
brought on by the changes in NAFTA.'
8' PROSEC enables tariff-free entry of non-
175. See Bacon, supra note 127, at 20.
176. See Nauman, supra note 174, at 1 (acknowledging that companies make Mexicans fearful of losing
their jobs so they accept lower wages).
177. See Susan Ferriss, Mexican President Ends U.S. Trip, Cox News Service, Nov. 6, 2003,
(Business), at 4H (reporting Fox discussing Mexico's problems with attracting foreign investment to Mexico,
specifically the maquiladora industry).
178. See generally supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text (reviewing the gridlock in Mexico's
Congress).
179. See infra notes 180-219 and accompanying text (outlining the bills passed or amended by Congress
and Fox that greatly affect the maquiladora industry).
180. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 35 & n.25 (reporting that to comply with Article
303 of NAFTA, Canada chose to eliminate hundreds of its most favored nation duties on inputs).
181. See id. at 39 (noting that in response to the crisis in the maquiladora industry, Mexico enacted
PROSEC to reduce the impact of Article 303); GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 34; Rojas, supra note
80, at 12 (articulating the requirements of Article 303); see also supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text
(explaining the implications of Article 303). The provision eliminated the tax waivers for non-North American
maquiladoras.
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NAFTA inputs not readily available through a NAFTA partner.12 However, the
application process that requires tracking the origin of thousands of production parts
is extensive."' Additionally, the Mexican government damaged investor confidence
in the PROSEC program by revoking many tax exemptions that maquiladoras were
relying on under PROSEC. S4 Maquiladora representatives complained that PROSEC
did not provide enough assistance to compensate for the effects of Article 303 of
NAFTA.' 5  Further, U.S. foreign investment declined because of PROSEC.' s6 The
program decreased the value of NAFTA's duty-free exports for U.S. suppliers.'87
Consequently, to enhance PROSEC for foreign investors, Mexico expanded the list
of products eligible for tariff reduction under PROSEC throughout 2001 and 2002
enabling investors to obtain more exemptions.'SS
Second, in April 2002, Fox amended the maquiladora and PITEX decrees to
eliminate the tedious tracking formerly required for tax reasons. 89  This
amendment reduces the administrative burden for maquiladora and PITEX
companies. 9 Mexico originally established PITEX in 1990 as a viable foreign
investment alternative to maquiladoras' 9' to permit companies to import inputs
182. See Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18 (relating that the Mexican government passed PROSEC in
response to industry appeals over rising tariffs). The program permits maquiladoras to apply for reduced tariffs
of up to five percent. Id.
183. See id. (portraying the PROSEC process as tedious).
184. See Steven B. Zisser, Rules Still Unclear for Mexican Maquiladora Program, Danzas AEI, Issue 298 (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.cadanzas.com/fiameseLcgi?winLocatin=http://Www.cadanzas.com/wordwide/north
america/resource/298.htmnl (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the
Mexican government removed hundreds of Harmonized Tariff Schedule numbers that were previously covered under
PROSEC). "Unlike the United States, Mexican Decrees are subject to immediate modifications or revocations without any
opportunity for a challenge or comment". 11 For an explanation of the term "HTS numbers" see Donald L. Fischer, Import
ABCs-Knowledge of Classification Rules Helps Importers Determine Duties, J. CoM., Nov. 6, 1996, (Global Commerce),
at 2C (explaining that the HTS numbers resulted from an agreement of nations belonging to the WTO). The HiTS number
describes the commodity and its appropriate duty rate. Id Under NAFTA, items with certain HTS numbers are imported
duty free. Id.
185. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 39 (stating "PROSEC was too restrictive because it
applied to very few imported inputs").
186. See Breidenstine, supra note 129 (explaining that the PROSEC program has lessened the value of
the duty exemption enjoyed by the United States for products made in Mexico). Since duty-free entry for U.S.
suppliers of electrical components is less competitive, foreign investment originating from the United States
decreased. Id.
187. See id. (noting that PROSEC established most-favored nation tariffs of five percent for many
categories of industrial inputs, which positively affected some foreign investors, but negatively affected U.S.
investors).
188. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 39 (noting that the list of products eligible for tariff
reduction "expanded to include more than 16,000 products from twenty-two industry sectors, including
electronics, textiles, and apparel").
189. See Edmundo Elfas-Femindez, How Latest Changes to Mexican Customs and Laws Impact
Exporters, MANAGING EXPORTS, Mar. 2003, at 1 (arguing that the new decree is a major breakthrough for
maquiladora and PITEX owners).
190. See id. at 1 (noting that investors previously tracked the machinery and equipment for five years).
191. See Justin Gazer Rice, Comment, PITEX and Maquiladora Import Programs: A Working Guide
and Comparative Evaluation, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 365, 368-69 (1998) (comparing the differences between the
PITEX and maquiladora programs).
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duty-free.' 92 While maquiladoras are usually located in northern Mexico along the
U.S.-Mexico border, PITEX companies more often locate in the interior of
Mexico.'93 As a result, PITEX companies typically use more Mexican inputs than
maquiladoras.' 9'
Third, in September 2002, Mexico and fifty-eight other countries signed ITA
Plus, which removes tariffs from electronic and high technology inputs,
regardless of the country of origin.' 95 ITA Plus will gradually remove tariffs from
semi-finished and finished products in electronic and high technology sectors.
9 6
ITA Plus will eliminate most of the costs in the domestic productive chain and
allow the domestic market to grow and allow the administration to save on
imports and exports.1
97
Fourth, in October 2002, Fox and the Mexican Congress signed several tax
laws to benefit maquiladoras. The new rules provide a basis for companies to
establish, expand, or maintain export-oriented manufacturing operations in
Mexico with a high level of certainty regarding taxes.'
98 Chiefly, the government
passed a law lowering the corporate income tax rate, which includes
maquiladoras, one percent each year until 2005.99 In addition to lower corporate
taxes, the legislature devised a simpler formula for maquiladoras to avoid the
permanent establishment tax.2° Maquiladoras no longer need to apply for an
"advance-pricing agreement" to avoid the permanent establishment tax.20' The
legislature also devised a simpler formula for calculating the transfer price that
192. See GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 6 & n.4 (explaining that Mexico "PITEX requires
companies to export a minimum of thirty percent [30%] of their total annual sales").
193. See id. at 6 n.4 (contrasting maquiladoras with PITEX companies).
194. Id.
195. See id. at 39 (stating that Mexican officials believe that 1TA Plus may help reduce the
administrative burden on maquiladoras).
196. See id. at 39 & n.28 (mentioning that Mexico did not formally commit to these tariff reductions
under the WTO, which can be removed at any time).
197. Electronics Industry to Reduce Prices on 3,200 Products with ITA Plus, CORP. MEX., Sept. 11,
2002 (illustrating that ITA Plus reduces taxes on 209 products beginning September 2002, twenty-two products
beginning January 2003, and sixty-one products beginning January 2004).
198. John A. McLees, Jaime Gonzalez-Bendiksen, & Carlos Angulo, Mexico Enacts Major
Improvements to its Maquiladora Tax Regime, TAX ANALYSTS WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 27, 2003
(advising that the previous uncertainty surrounding Mexico's tax laws undermined its ability to compete for
new foreign investment).
199. See Manuel Solano, Spate [sic] of Recent Tax Developments in Mexico Offers Glimpse of Changes
in Store for 2004, TAX ANALYSTS WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Nov. 19, 2003 (stating that the corporate income
tax rate will fall from thirty-five percent in 2002 to thirty-four percent in 2003 and so forth until 2005); see also
Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27 (noting that legislation lowered the corporate income tax rate).
200. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text (defining and reviewing the effects of the permanent
establishment tax); see also McLees et al., supra note 198 (identifying the new amendment to the Income Tax
Law as Article 216-Bis).
201. Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27; see McLees et al., supra note 198 (explaining that
maquiladoras with capital-intensive operations with substantial foreign-owned assets will usually elect an
advance pricing agreement). Even with the high administrative costs and uncertainties associated with APAs,
the agreements are still lower than the other options under the permanent establishment tax exemption. Id.
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foreign firms must pay in order to maintain the exemption from the permanent
establishment tax.202
Finally, in October 2003, Fox and the legislature agreed to provide maquiladoras
with an additional tax exemption.' °3 The new law recognizes that maquiladoras
constitute an important source of employment for Mexico and the Fox Administration
has a policy of establishing mechanisms to promote maquiladoras. 2°' The income tax
exemption amends the prior 2002 income tax law.25 The tax exemption seeks to make
Mexico more competitive for low-cost manufacturing, in comparison with other
countries, primarily China.2°
In conclusion, the changes in PROSEC and PITEX, the new ITA Plus law,
and the new tax exemptions have provided maquiladoras with more incentives to
invest in Mexico. However, further changes in the political climate and the global
economy are also necessary to entice foreign investment to Mexico.
B. Changes in Mexico's Political Climate
In addition to changes in taxes, Fox has also changed the political
environment in Mexico. Pressure from the maquiladora industry caused the
Mexican government to create the Presidential Council for Competitiveness, to
approve the Decree for the Development and Operation of the Maquiladora
Export Industry ("Maquiladora Decree"), and to pass the Freedom of Information
Law.
In July 2002, the Mexican government, along with private business, created
the Presidential Council for Competitiveness. 207  "It promotes investment,
increases employment, and accelerates Mexico's economic growth., 20 ' The
program is a cooperative effort between government and business with the
Mexico Ministry of Economy ("SECON") 2°9 overseeing the council. 210 SECON's
202. See Mexico: Maquila Doors Closing, supra note 27 (noting that the government needs to approve
more changes to keep maquiladoras healthy in the long term).
203. See New Tax Incentives, No. 7, Baker & MqKenzie, (Nov. 2003), available at http://bakemet.
com/BakerNet/default.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter New Tax Incentives] (indicating that the Fox
Administration implemented the income tax exemption to promote maquiladora growth).
204. Id.
205. Cf id. (stating that the taxpayer must comply with Article 216-Bis of the Income Tax Law).
206. Cf Michael Becka et al., Latin American Tax Review: Update on Mexico's Maquiladora Tax
Benefits, TAX ANALYSTS WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 16, 2004 (identifying China as a low-cost
manufacturing jurisdiction in competition with Mexico).
207. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 39.
208. Id.
209. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico's New Cabinet Hailed as Business-Savvy; Politics: President-
Elect Fox Taps U.S.-Trained Experts, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at Cl (announcing that World Bank
economist Luis Emesto Derbez will head the new SECON). SECON handles trade and promotes small and
mid-size businesses. Id.; see also Managing Exports Miscellany, MANAGING EXPORTS, (June 2003), at 8
(explaining that the acronym "SECON" signifies the Mexico Ministry of Economy).
210. GAO Report No. 03-891, supra note 12, at 39.
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activities include creating a fiscal stimulus package for export factories, including
maquiladoras."
In May 2003, Mexico published the Maquiladora Decree, which modifies
certain aspects of the maquiladora industry . 2" The Maquiladora Decree simplifies
regulations for companies that provide support and logistic services to
maquiladoras." The Maquiladora Decree streamlines customs requirements for
companies with several subsidiaries operating under one maquiladora program.2 14
In addition to these changes, the Maquiladora Decree also reduces administrative
costs and procedures related to annual reporting functions . 5
In June 2003, Fox's Administration advanced efforts to eliminate corruption
in the bureaucracy and police by passing the Freedom of Information Law.2 6 This
law sheds light on all aspects of government because it requires all branches of
government to provide copies of government documents for public inspection."'
In addition to the Freedom of Information Law, Fox has also publicized
information about his personal income and investments and his administration's
expenditures."' President Fox's gestures have translated to improved police
professionalism. 9
C. Changes Between Mexico and the Global Economy
Given the increased competition for maquiladoras, Fox is working to face the
challenges of a growing global economy. Two major components affect
Mexico's competitiveness: the U.S. economy and the value of the peso. These
components have recently changed in Mexico's favor. Primarily, President Fox is
211. See id. (noting that the Secretary of the Economy has agreed to fund a comprehensive study on the
maquiladora industry). The funding will come from the National Council of the Maquiladora Export Industry
("CNIME"). Id.
212. See id. at 38 & n.27 (stating that the Maquiladora Decree will enhance legal certainty for
maquiladoras). The Mexican government aimed reforms at simplifying regulations for companies that provide
support and logistic services to maquiladoras. Id.
213. See id. at 38 (reporting that "it remains unclear whether the Maquiladora decree will satisfy
maquiladora critics who seek greater legal certainty and improved incentives for maquiladoras").
214. See id. (noting that this streamlined customs system will allow companies with several subsidiaries
to transfer finished or semi-finished products from one subsidiary to another).
215. See id. (providing an example of an administrative cost-saving feature that maquiladoras will only
have to submit one annual report, which maquiladoras can now submit electronically).
216. Geri Smith, Mexico: Vibrant Democracy is Still a Long Way Off, Bus. WK., July 14, 2003 (Bus.
Wk. Int'l Edition), at 24 [hereinafter Democracy Long Way Off]; E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexico Starts Freedom of
Information Act, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, June 11, 2003 available at 2003 WL58611421.
217. Democracy Long Way Off, supra note 216, at 24; see Castillo, supra note 216 (noting that the law
permits Mexican citizens to obLain government documents within twenty days of request). Examples of
government documents include employee wage statements, details regarding public programs, and government
contracts. Id.
218. See Castillo, supra note 216 (indicating that Fox revealed his personal and presidential
expenditures to make the Mexican government more responsible).
219. See Opening Mexico; Don't Overlook Legacy of Transparency, supra note 97, at 16A (arguing
Mexican citizens have not given President Fox enough credit for improving law enforcement).
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attempting to alter Mexico's dependence on the United States by encouraging
more foreign investment from other countries. 220 However, since Mexico
currently still depends on the U.S. economy, the improvement of the U.S.
121 222economy during 2003221 should make investment in Mexico more lucrative. In
addition, since 2002, the peso has depreciated twenty percent against the U.S.
dollar, and this has helped Mexico regain its competitiveness.223
Mexico's poor infrastructure affects competition with other countries, 224 but one
goal of the United States-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity plan ("Partnership")
includes updating the economic infrastructure.225 In February 2001, Presidents Fox
and Bush 26  signed the Partnership, which contemplates projects to facilitate
investment in small business, infrastructure, and technology. 227 The Partnership
prompted a successful meeting among 800 U.S. and Mexican businesses to discuss
housing, infrastructure, and information technology.228 New business ventures will
develop as a result of the Partnership.229 Presidents Fox and Bush also pledged to
work together regarding North American energy resources.230
220. See Donnelly, supra note 121 (announcing that President Fox would like to make a trade agreement
with Japan to diversify foreign investment in Mexico).
221. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COM., BEA Report No. 03-11, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY
INDUSTRY FOR 2002: SERVICES-PRODUCING SECTOR LEADS ECONOMIC REBOUND; MANUFACTURING BEGINS
RECOVERY (2003) (reporting "a broad-based economic rebound in 2002" for the United States). The real gross
national product increased from 0.3 percent in 2001 to 2.4 percent in 2002. Id.
222. See John Authers & Sara Silver, Free trade with the US and Canada did not Spur Wider Economic
Reform, and Limited Progress Towards Creating Prosperity is in Danger of Stalling, FIN. TIMES, (London),
July 1, 2003, (Comment & Analysis), at 19 (indicating that Mexico's foreign investment leveled off but the
upturn in the U.S. economy may reverse the trend).
223. Geri Smith, Solid Growth, Sluggish Government, BUS. WK., Feb. 16, 2004, at 30 [hereinafter Solid
Growth, Sluggish Government].
224. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text (comparing Mexico's infrastructure to other
countries in competition with Mexico).
225. See Jerry K. Mitchell, The Partnership for Prosperity, Spreading the Benefits of NAFTA, U.S.
Commercial Service, Mexico (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.export.gov/exportamerica/NewOpportunities/
no mexico_1 103.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (summarizing the
Partnership for Prosperity initiative).
226. George W. Bush is the 43rd President of the United States. Mention of Bush, the Bush
Administration, or President Bush in this Comment is in reference to George W. Bush unless otherwise noted.
227. See Hale E. Sheppard, Revamping the Export-Import Bank in 2002: The Impact of this Interim
Solution on the United States and Latin America, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 124 (2003) (describing
the private-public alliance designed to foster an environment where Mexican citizens are not compelled to
abandon their country due to a scarcity of jobs).
228. See Mitchell, supra note 225 (asserting that a similar conference is expected in 2004 to highlight
other key industry and service sectors).
229. Id. (stating that the United States Trade and Development Agency is "funding feasibility studies in
the transportation, energy, and infrastructure sectors, which will increase United States exports").
230. See Press Release, Joint Statement by President George Bush and President Vicente Fox Towards a
Partnership for Prosperity, The Guanajuato Proposal, (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010220-2.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the United States and Mexico will consult with Canada regarding energy
resources).
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The various changes in the global economy, such as a stronger U.S. economy
and weaker peso, should initiate more foreign investment in Mexico. In addition,
the Partnership between the two presidents should create better infrastructure and
energy use in Mexico, which is vital to the maquiladora industry.
V. CONCLUSION
Fox's presidency shows limited success for the maquiladora industry.
President Fox needs to convince Congress to pass tax and electricity reforms that
will permit Mexico to remain competitive in the maquiladora industry."' The
multi-party gridlock in Congress prevents the President from addressing the
country's problems.232 Only fierce negotiations and flexibility within the reigning
PRI will keep investment pouring into Mexico. If Fox can implement changes,
foreign investment in Mexico will improve. 233 However, if Fox continues the
trend of taxing foreign companies, particularly those not from the United States,
234foreign investors will likely look elsewhere for better investment opportunities.
Indeed, Japan already announced that it will move its manufacturing out of
Mexico if changes to security, labor, tax structure, and infrastructure are not
implemented.23
In January 2004, Presidents Fox and Bush met in Mexico for the Special
Summit of the Americas, in which the two presidents renewed their commitment
to the Partnership between the two countries.236 This meeting was a positive sign
for the future of U.S. investment in Mexico and it showed that President Fox will
continue in his attempt to improve foreign investment in Mexico. 237 For example,
in October 2003, President Fox praised Ford Motor Company's long presence in
231. See Mexico's Broken Dream, supra note 11, at 4H (stating that all analysts agree that Mexico's
government must act swiftly to enact reforms to attract investment); see also Cahas & Coronado, supra note 18
(acknowledging Mexico needs tax reform, specifically, clear and definite tax rules for maquiladoras).
232. See Wise, supra note 4, at 306 (noting that the three main political parties, PRI, PAN, and PRD are
feuding amongst themselves in Congress).
233. See Garza, supra note 36 (noting that leaders in Mexico need to implement a range of reforms in
order for the country to experience strong economic growth and job creation).
234. See Cafias & Coronado, supra note 18 (arguing that changes are needed in order for Mexico to
remain competitive).
235. See Japan Threatens to Withdraw Investments, D1ARO CIUDAD JuAREZ, Dec. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.maquilaportal.concgi-bin/publicihisthist.pl?Klein=2003-12-16&Klein2=5878&Klein3=DECEMBER
(last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the Japanese Ambassador to
Mexico, Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, warned Mexico that countries, such as China, are offering more favorable investment
conditions).
236. See Garza, supra note 36 (asserting that the meeting will precipitate the goals of economic growth
and job creation in both countries); see also Media Availability with U.S. President George W. Bush and
Mexican President Vicente Fox Quesada Following their Meeting, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 12, 2004 (relating
that the two presidents will work towards developing their economies and achieving competitiveness and
productivity).
237. See Garza, supra note 36 (stating that the presidents will join with other leaders in the Western
Hemisphere to promote open economies).
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Mexico and Ford's intent to invest $1.6 billion to build a new factory in
Mexico. 38 Ford's investment is evidence that Fox continues to make Mexico a
competitive market to attract U.S. investors. However, Article 303 still inhibits
investment from other countries, with the exception of companies whose
manufacturing requires just-in-time shipping. In October 2003, industry
production began growing in Mexico. It has displayed its best performance in
four years.2 9 Accordingly, maquiladora investment should increase in 2004, even
if Congress does not pass Fox's fiscal, labor, and energy reforms.40 Yet, it
appears that Fox's tax and energy reform bills may pass by the end of 2004.4
Therefore, even with the tumultuous political environment, potential investors
should take into account that Mexico remains the closest country to the United
States that a manufacturer can produce a product at a minimal price.
238. See Mexico's Broken Dream, supra note 11, at 4H (acknowledging that finished-auto-for export
assembly is growing in Mexico).
239. See Solid Growth, Sluggish Government, supra note 223, at 30 (adding that Mexico's economy is
expected to expand from 3 to 3.5 percent in 2004).
240. See id. (explaining that Mexico needs reforms to generate vigorous growth); see also New Increase
in Maquiladora Investment?, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Dec. 22, 2003, available at http://www.maquilaportal. com (last
visited Mar. 3, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that SECON predicts an overall
growth of 6 to 10 percent in the maquiladora industry in 2004). In addition, CNIME and President Fox predict
foreign investment will increase $800 million dollars from 2003. Id.
241. See Solano, supra note 199 (noting that Fox's proposal to amend Mexico's Federal Tax Code may
be implemented in 2004); see also Solid Growth, Sluggish Government, supra note 223, at 30 (noting that a
limited number of energy reforms may pass in 2004). But see Jorge Castafieda, It's Not Too Late for President
Fox to Shake Up Gridlocked Mexico, BALT. SUN, Jan. 21, 2004, (Editorial), at 17A (arguing that the Mexican
Congress will definitely not pass Fox's tax, energy, labor, or political reforms).
